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Constitutional theorizing is a tricky business. The document is ancient, was often written
to fix discrete problems that have little modern salience, and frequently contains vague and
capacious language, the plausible extension of which defies straightforward theoretical exegesis.
On occasion, as with the Fourth Amendment, all three symptoms may be present, making
theorizing a largely futile endeavor.1

The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment

suffers from at least two of these three problems. It is certainly ancient and was written to
eliminate specific abuses of authority that have no close modern analogues;2 indeed, the most
unproblematic application of the right against self-incrimination today is to custodial
interrogation by the police, a practice that did not even exist when the Fifth Amendment was
ratified.3

Even though the language of the Fifth Amendment (which henceforth we use
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interchangeably with “Self-Incrimination Clause”) is more constraining than that of the Fourth,
given the total reformation of the practical significance of the Fifth Amendment, perhaps it is not
surprising that the theoretical foundations of the Fifth Amendment are thought to be in disarray,
a belief fed in part by inadequacies of the Supreme Court’s efforts to articulate its foundations.
The Supreme Court’s opinions contain stirring rhetoric that may move the heart but leave the
intellect unconvinced. In the most famous articulation of the theoretical foundations of the fifth
amendment, the Courtsaid :
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of selfaccusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements
will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which
dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load; our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent. 4
The various points in the quoted passage are striking in their vacuity and circularity. To
take but a few examples: an innocent person faces no trilemma; there is no simply dichotomy
between accusatorial and inquisitorial regimes; never has the government had to “shoulder the
entire load”; far from “human personality” being “inviolable,” law molds and shapes “human
personality” directly, constantly and unavoidably; immunity permits the most private aspects of a
person’s life to be divulged, as occurs in civil cases daily across the land. These points are not
new. 5 Even Justice Goldberg, the author of the paragraph, observed that the Self-Incrimination
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Clause is “regarded as so fundamental a part of our constitutional fabric, despite the fact that ‘the
law and the lawyers . . . have never made up their minds just what it is supposed to do or just
whom it is intended to protect.’”6
This conceptual ambiguity has not escaped the scholars and has led to a proliferation of
scholarly emendations to the Court’s explanations, which uniformly fail to convince.7 Amar and
Lettow wrote, “[t]he Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an unsolved riddle of
vast proportions, a Gordian knot in the middle of our Bill of Rights.”8 William Stuntz summed it
up: “It is probably fair to say that most people familiar with the doctrine surrounding the
privilege against self-incrimination believe that it cannot be squared with any rational theory.”9
But there is an ambiguity in the word “theory” threaded through the various judicial and
scholarly treatments of the Fifth Amendment. It sometimes is used to refer to the justification of
a practice, which is the sense in which Justice Goldberg was theorizing. At other times it is used
to predict or prescribe the scope or limitations of governmental power on the one hand, or
privacy, autonomy, or dignity interests of citizens on the other.

Some of the theoretical

difficulties infecting the Fifth Amendment may result from failing to sort out these different
perspectives. To be sure, one reasonably may think that the theoretical justification for a practice
must constrain its scope. Interestingly, the Fifth Amendment offers a counter-example to such a
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belief, which is the main burden of this article. While its justification is, we agree, hopelessly
muddled, the scope of the Fifth Amendment (its implications in the real world for
government/citizen interactions) can be specified quite clearly. While, in other words, there is
no general theoretical justification for the Fifth Amendment, there is a powerfully explanatory
positive theory. Moreover, we can specify equally precisely where there remains ambiguity, and
the possible directions that future developments might take—indeed, must take, given what the
Court has done to date. Which path the Court may choose is unclear, but the paths that will be
open are apparent. In this respect, the Court’s treatment of the self-incrimination clause mirrors
its treatment of the fourth amendment.10 Both defy general justificatory theories, yet both lead to
relatively predictable results. This, in turn, may have implications for the nature and utility of
some forms of legal scholarship, a point we return to at the conclusion of this article.
Although discussion of abstract values can still be found occasionally in its opinions,11
the Supreme Court has shifted to a formal approach to the Fifth Amendment.12 The SelfIncrimination Clause states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”13

Under what Lance Cole described as “Fisher’s new textualist

analytical approach,”14 the Court has concluded that Fifth Amendment violations must contain
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three elements: compulsion, incrimination, and testimony.15 Testimony, however, has never
been clearly defined and is the source of the remaining unpredictability in the future of the Fifth
Amendment. Although never acknowledged by the Court, its cases make plain that “testimony”
is the substantive content of cognition—the propositions with truth-value that people hold or
generate (as distinct from the ability to hold or generate propositions with truth-value).
This observation leads to a comprehensive positive theory of the Fifth Amendment right:
the government may not compel disclosure of the incriminating substantive results of cognition
that themselves (the substantive results) are the product of state action As we demonstrate in this
article, this theory explains all of the cases, a feat not accomplished under any other scholarly or
judicial theory. Indeed, its fit with the cases is remarkable. As we develop below, it even
explains the most obvious datum that might be advanced against it—the sixth birthday question
in Muniz. 16
As we also elaborate below, there remain two sources of ambiguity in Fifth Amendment
adjudications. First, compulsion and incrimination are both continuous variables—questions of
degree. The Court has recognized this, and set about defining the amount of compulsion and
incrimination essential to a Fifth Amendment violation. The result is a common law of both
topics rather than a precise metric of either, but still the lay of the land is relatively clear.
Thankfully, since these two variables are independent and do not interact, computational
complexities do not creep in. “Compulsion,” in other words, is not determined in part by the
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extent to which the results are “incriminating.” Compulsion is determined on its own, as is the
sufficiency of incrimination.
The second source of ambiguity arises because the Court has not explicitly equated
“testimony” with cognition (again, thoughts in the form of propositions with truth-value). As we
show, though, that is precisely what has controlled the Court’s decisions. Given that the Court’s
opinions have not focused on substantive cognition as the third element of a Fifth Amendment
violation, it is not surprising that the Court has not clarified whether cognition, too, is a
continuous or discontinuous variable. This is where the future lies. The Court will have to
clarify two matters: first, whether the extent of cognition matters, and second, the derivative
consequences of cognition. In addition, the Court will have to determine whether these two
issues are, like compulsion and incrimination, independent or dependent. Does the extensiveness
of the compelled cognition determine how far its causal effect will be traced?
Part I elaborates our positive theory of the Fifth Amendment through an examination of
the three variables that constitute it. Of course a positive theory is not normative or justificatory,
and to be clear, although we return to this point at the end of the article, we largely leave such
inquiry to others (largely because we think it a futile and misguided waste of resources that
misconceives the very phenomena supposedly being theorized17). In Part II, we elaborate on the
ambiguity introduced into Fifth Amendment adjudications by the Court’s recent decision in
United States v. Hubbell.18 We show that in Hubbell the Court veered sharply from the apparent
course set by Fisher v. United States,19 by recognizing a dramatically different role for cognition
and its consequences.

In Fisher, though compelled cognition itself was protected, law

enforcement had ready access to the incriminating information derived from it. In Hubbell, by
17
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inflating derivative use immunity to previously unseen proportions, the Court expanded the
scope of protection. After Hubbell, there are three possibilities for the future of the privilege
against self-incrimination, which Part III explores: 1) the Court will view Hubbell as a mere
bump in the road past which the Fisher line of cases will continue, ultimately ignoring the new
approach with which Hubbell flirted; 2) Hubbell will be followed to its natural end in an
expansive derivative use doctrine triggered by any compelled cognition; or 3) the most likely
possibility is that the Court will develop in a common-law manner the concept of “extensive” use
of a suspect’s cognition, referred to in Hubbell, and begin to identify some threshold for
“extensive” cognition that separates Hubbell and Fisher, in addition to constraining derivative
use.

I.

Compulsion, Incrimination, and Cognition
Law enforcement officers ask John Doe to consent to a lie detector test but
Doe refuses, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The
officers try to physically restrain him, but he resists. Eventually, they strap Doe
to a gurney and attach a polygraph machine. The tester begins to ask questions.
He first asks Doe easy questions like his name, age, and address. The officers
already have this information but they want to establish his baseline, normal
response. Doe refuses to answer even these simple questions and sits silently.
Though the tester is not able to elicit any oral responses, he records Doe’s
physiological responses to the questions.
After working through his script of introductory questions, the tester
moves on to questions about Doe’s participation in a crime. Doe remains silent,
but the tester continues to record the changes in his heart rate, blood pressure,
breathing, and electrodermal responses (electrical conductance at the skin
level).20 The questions become more and more specific but Doe never speaks; in
fact, he does his best not to communicate anything at all to the tester.
At one point, the tester asks about the victim of the crime they are
investigating. The officers know that a little girl was abducted from a YMCA in
Des Moines, Iowa on Christmas Eve. An eyewitness described someone who
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looked like Doe and the officers arrested him pursuant to a warrant. Now they
urgently want to find the little girl. The officers have provided the tester with
maps of a twenty-mile area around the YMCA. The tester divides the map with a
grid and tries to elicit from Doe the location of the little girl. Systematically,
starting with large quadrants and narrowing to a smaller area, the tester points
to each section of the map. Still, Doe remains silent and the tester records his
physiological responses. By continuing this process, the tester is able to narrow
in and find a very specific location that causes Doe to respond dramatically: his
heart races and his breathing quickens. The officers search this location and find
the body of the little girl.
Later, the State admits the polygraph test results at Doe’s trial for
abduction and murder. In his testimony, the tester reads each question that he
asked Doe and describes Doe’s physiological responses. He shows the jury how
he systematically pointed to each area of the map and describes how he was able
to elicit from Doe enough information to lead the officers to the body. The jury
convicts.21
The implications of this hypothetical have bedeviled analysis of the Fifth Amendment.
There is perhaps universal agreement that the actions of the officers violate the Fifth
Amendment, but why?

There is certainly compulsion and incrimination, but where is the

testimony?22 The lack of a clear answer feeds the sense that there is a conceptual hole at the
middle of the Fifth Amendment. Testimony is a necessary ingredient; yet even though it is
absent, the universal intuition is that strapping someone to a lie detector would violate the
Constitution.23 The answer to this puzzle is that “testimony” means the substantive results of
cognition. It is the failure to recognize that “testimony” reduces to cognition that has left the
Justices and the theorists unable to explain the hypothetical—and more importantly to construct
a coherent explanation of the cases. We discuss compulsion, incrimination, and testimony in
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turn, the first two somewhat more briefly as they present no real theoretical problems, and
testimony as cognition more in detail, as that is the contribution and the lynchpin of our
argument. The section closes with a comprehensive theory of the privilege that explains all of
the cases.

A.

Compulsion

The test for compulsion under the Fifth Amendment is “whether, considering the totality
of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.”24 Most of the difficulty with
determining compulsion is a direct consequence of the free will/determinism problem at the
center of this definition.25

If free will does not exist, the most plausible position,26 then

obviously the test is conceptually and functionally bankrupt. If it does exist, then either all
choices are exercises of free will (a person can always choose to endure more torture), leaving
the test inconsequential if not bankrupt, or there is no method to distinguish whether a particular
act is a result of free will or of free will being overborne. How would we ever know, for
instance, if a particular person being subjected to torture could have held out but confessed
because of the rising tide of guilt washing over him? And how would we know whether the
mildest threat, like the risk of a short jail sentence, actually overbore the will of a weak-willed
individual?
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Although some of the rhetoric of the Supreme Court, and that of some commentators,
remain fascinated with, or stuck in, the free will/determinism debate,27 the results of the cases are
explainable in other terms, indicating that the Fifth Amendment does not require an answer to the
problem. Free will, despite the assertions of some,28 is not a necessary predicate for criminal law
generally, or for the right against compelled self-incrimination specifically.29 As in many areas
of the law, the Court has employed an objective test that focuses on the governmental action
rather than the individual response. This converts the meaningless or intractable question of free
will into a demarcation of how much pressure is too much to exceed the threshold for
the“compulsion” necessary for a Fifth Amendment violation.30
The question remains, where is the demarcation—what sorts of governmental actions that
result in disclosure of self-incriminating testimony are prohibited by the Constitution? The
answer emerges from the Court’s assessments of social conventions concerning threats and
promises, assessments that are factually bound and developed in a traditional common-law
manner. One such convention is that physical force is inappropriate, and thus the case of John
27
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Doe involves compulsion.31 If there is any “testimony” in Doe’s hypothetical case, it was
obtained by physically restraining him and subjecting him to unwanted touching by a machine.
Through a standard common-law approach the Court has placed various kinds of
compulsion along a continuum, producing a list of acceptable and unacceptable governmental
actions. Examples abound; indeed, they define the constitutional conception of compulsion for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment. A defendant may be made to allocute when entering a guilty
plea.32 The government can place burdens on an individual’s out-of-court choice whether to
invoke the privilege.33 There is no “impermissible coercion” where the defendant is not involved
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in the production of information,34 or takes an action contrary to what the state wants him to
do.35 Included here are cases where the individual lies,36 refuses to cooperate with a permissible
test,37 or engages in “guilty conduct.”38

The government has clearly applied too much

pressure—compulsion has occurred—where there has been physical or psychological torture,39

participate in political associations and to hold public office are penalties capable of coercing incriminating
testimony).
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invoking the privilege against self-incrimination). It is possible to imagine a situation in which a suspect is
compelled to lie by being forced to sign a confession he knows is not true. This would satisfy the compulsion
component of a Fifth Amendment violation.
37
See, e.g., Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (finding no violation of the privilege for lack of compulsion where the state
admitted the defendant’s refusal to take a blood-alcohol test that could be legitimately compelled by the state).
Refusals to speak, or choosing to remain silent, cannot be presented as evidence of guilt. This is not because the
refusal has been compelled but because to comment on silence may make the assertion of the right too burdensome.
See supra note xx and accompanying text.
38
When an individual engages in what might be described as “guilty conduct,” such as unprovoked flight from
police or destruction of evidence, there is no compulsion and thus no violation of the privilege if evidence of such
conduct is introduced at trial as circumstantial evidence of the individual’s consciousness of guilt. Professor
Arenella argued that use of “guilty conduct evidence” is not a violation of the Self-incrimination Clause, but
emphasized that this was because the conduct was not “testimonial.” Arenella, supra note xx, at 43. We believe
that “guilty conduct evidence,” is best analyzed under the compulsion component. Though the Supreme Court has
not squarely addressed this issue, it is firmly established that guilty conduct evidence may be presented and
commented on at trial without violating a defendant’s right against self-incrimination. See United States v. Carter,
236 F.3d 777, 792 n.11 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court gave the following
instruction on flight: “You have received evidence that after the crime was supposed to have been committed, the
Defendant, Roquel Allen Carter, fled. If you believe from the evidence that the Defendant did indeed flee, then you
may consider this conduct, along with all the other evidence, in deciding whether the Government has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged. This conduct may indicate that he thought he was
guilty and was trying to avoid punishment. On the other hand, sometimes an innocent person may flee to avoid
being arrested, or for some other innocent reason.”).
39
See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 26 (2002) (“Determining what constitutes unconstitutional compulsion involves
a question of judgment: Courts must decide whether the consequences of an inmate’s choice to remain silent are
closer to the physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects or the de minimis harms against which it
does not.”); Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (“One of [the privilege’s] purposes is to prevent the state,
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or where a defendant, upon a grant of immunity, has been ordered to testify in court under
penalty of contempt.40
These determinations by courts of what constitutes impermissible coercion do little more
than reflect our conventions about when an individual’s will is likely to be overborne. Professor
Peter Westen and Stewart Mandell recognized that compulsion is a continuous variable involving
different kinds or levels of pressure in differing settings.41 Not only is there a common-law line
demarking how much compulsion is necessary for a Fifth Amendment violation, but Westen and

whether by force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under
investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.”).
See also Alschuler, supra note xx, at 192 (analyzing the meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege at the time of
the adoption of the amendment and concluding, “the Fifth Amendment privilege prohibited (1) incriminating
interrogation under oath, (2) torture, and (3) probably other forms of coercive interrogation such as threats of future
punishment and promises of leniency.”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966) (creating the presumption of
compulsion in custodial interrogations after observing that “[a]n individual swept from familiar surroundings into
police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above
cannot be otherwise than under the compulsion to speak.”).
40
See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983) (observing that the “classic Fifth Amendment violation” is
“telling a defendant at trial to testify.”); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (“Testimony given in
response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony. In such cases there is no question
whether physical or psychological pressures overrode the defendant’s will; the witness is told to talk or face the
government’s coercive sanctions, notably, a conviction for contempt. The information given in response to a grant
of immunity may well be more reliable than information beaten from a helpless defendant, but it is no less
compelled. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide a privilege against compelled self-incrimination, not
merely against unreliable self-incrimination. . . . Here, . . . we deal with the constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination in its most pristine form.”); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964)
(finding that testimony obtained under a grant of immunity from state prosecution is compelled and thus cannot be
used in federal prosecution either).
In addition, the Court has constructed several prophylactic rules to protect the exercise of the Fifth
Amendment. For example, a defendant’s right to invoke the privilege cannot be made too “costly” by allowing the
prosecutor to comment on the defendant’s silence. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965). In a formal
sense, the element of compulsion is lacking here because the defendant has taken an action contrary to what the state
wants him to do. Still, the Court has prohibited this and other state-imposed burdens where they may make the
assertion of the right too burdensome. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999) (stating that no
negative inferences may be drawn from the defendant’s failure to testify in the sentencing phase); Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (holding that “the Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must
give a ‘no-adverse-inference’ [from the failure to testify] jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so”);
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (holding that the Federal Kidnaping Act, which provided that a
death sentence could only be imposed through a jury verdict, was unconstitutional because the effect was to
“discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth
Amendment right to demand a jury trial.”); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1967) (refusing to find that
it was harmless error for the prosecutor to repeatedly comment on the defendant’s failure to testify); Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (“In this context ‘penalty’ is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means . . . the
imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege ‘costly.’”).
41
Peter Westen & Stewart Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the
“Preferred Response”, 91 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521, 535-40 (1982).
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Mandell suggested that different types of compulsion may require different procedures to avoid
Fifth Amendment violations.42 For example, a state can insist that an individual making a
compulsory tax filing make the “preferred response” of remaining silent, rather than lying or
incriminating himself.43

The constitutionally permissible consequences of not making this

“preferred response” are prosecution for perjury if the individual lies, or admission of the
incriminating statements against the individual in a prosecution of the substantive crime.44
Where compulsion takes the form of custodial interrogation, however, silence cannot be a
“preferred response” because a Fifth Amendment claim cannot be asserted through silence in
such a situation without “risking irreparable injury of the kind the privilege is designed to
prevent.”45 Westen and Mandell went on to consider several other types of compulsion and the
requirements for avoiding a Fifth Amendment violation.46 They have, in essence, provided a
map of what pressure is appropriate under what circumstances. Whether Westen and Mandell’s
map turns out to accurately predict the Court’s decisions, we predict that the Court will continue
the common-law process of locating types of pressure along the its conception of the proper
continuum and using social conventions to determine whether they are appropriate or
inappropriate.

B.

Incrimination

42

Id. at 535-37.
Id. at 532 n.40 (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 665 & n.21 (1976) (concluding that “since Garner
made disclosures instead of claiming the privilege on his tax returns his disclosures were not compelled
incriminations.”).
44
Id. at 532-33 (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970)).
45
Id. at 535-36 (“The state may not insist that a criminal suspect respond to custodial interrogation by remaining
silent. A suspect who is subjected to station house interrogation is constitutionally entitled to respond to police
compulsion by making an incriminating statement and later challenging its admission against him at trial. The
Supreme Court emphasized this point in Miranda v. Arizona.”).
46
Id. at 537-55 (analyzing several situations, including where there is insufficient time to reflect or where a witness
has reasonably relied on the state’s assurance of immunity).
43
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The second component necessary to a violation of the Fifth Amendment is incrimination.
The relevant question is “whether there is a risk that [the person’s] testimony will be used in a
proceeding that is a ‘criminal case’” in which the person is himself the defendant.47 This
formulation captures the two sides of this particular coin: 1) there must be a sufficient risk of
testimonial use, and 2) it must be in a criminal case.

Some proceedings simply are not

“criminal,” and thus there is no need to appraise the “risk” that compelled testimony will be used
against the individual. For example, there is no incrimination where a witness has been granted
immunity from criminal prosecution but still faces hardships such as the loss of a job” or
“general public opprobrium.”48 “The interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a
witness is asked to incriminate himself—in other words, to give testimony which may possibly
expose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been taken away the
Amendment ceases to apply.”49 In addition, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated if the person
resisting disclosure wishes to protect another natural50 or legal person,51 or where the legal
regulation is civil and the penalty is not punitive.52

47

United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998).
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956). See also Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949)
(“If a witness could not be prosecuted on facts concerning which he testified, the witness could not fairly say he had
been compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. He might suffer disgrace and humiliation but
such unfortunate results to him are outside of constitutional protection.”).
49
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906), cited in Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 430 (1956). See also,
Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 2000 (2003) (“We fail to see how, based on the text of the Fifth Amendment,
Martinez can allege a violation of this right, since Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to
be a witness against himself in a criminal case.”).
50
See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) (holding that where a taxpayer gave her tax records to
her accountant, and the “accountant makes no claim that he may tend to be incriminated by the production,” he too
is precluded from invoking the Fifth Amendment’s protections); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951)
(“the privilege against self-incrimination ‘is solely for the benefit of the witness,’ and ‘'is purely a personal privilege
of the witness.’ Petitioner expressly placed her original declination to answer on an untenable ground, since a
refusal to answer cannot be justified by a desire to protect others from punishment, much less to protect another
from interrogation by a grand jury.”).
51
See, e.g., United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944) (Whether an entity is entitled to protection turns on an
inquiry into whether “a particular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership
and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents,
but rather to embody their common or group interests only.”); George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S.
286, 288 (1967) (“the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is ‘essentially a personal one, applying only
48
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The “risk” part of the “incrimination” component is a variable. “The central standard for
the privilege’s application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and ‘real,’
and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.”53 Like compulsion, there is no
analytical dividing point that can explain why courts find no violation with an incrimination
likelihood of x, but do find a violation with a quantity of x + 1. The “substantial and real” test is
an attempt to locate on the continuum the threshold likelihood of incrimination that will trigger
the Fifth Amendment protection. Through case-by-case analysis, the Court has placed various
types of cases on either side of the threshold. The threshold has not been met and there is no
violation where, for example, information disclosures required by statute will not typically result
in the production of incriminating information,54 the government requires that records in “an

to natural individuals.’ It ‘cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.’”) (quoting
White, 322 U.S. at 698-99); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) (Communist Party may not claim
the privilege); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1974) (small law partnership may not claim the
privilege). But see United States v. Doe (Doe I), 465 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1984) (holding that a sole proprietor’s act of
production may be protected under the privilege).
52
See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 251 (1980) (mere civil liability “does not trigger all the protections
afforded by the Constitution to criminal defendants.”); United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S.
715, 718 (1971) (relying on Boyd v. United States for the proposition that “‘proceedings instituted for the purpose of
declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in
form, are in their nature criminal’ for Fifth Amendment purposes” and holding that where “money liability is
predicated upon a finding of the owner’s wrongful conduct,” the Fifth Amendment may be invoked in forfeiture
proceedings); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965) (finding, with regards to the
registration requirements for members of the Communist Party under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
that “Petitioners’ claims are not asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry, but against an
inquiry in an area permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the form’s questions in context might
involve the petitioners in the admission of a crucial element of a crime.”).
Deportation hearings are probably not “criminal” for Fifth Amendment purposes. See INS v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (Noting that a “deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine
eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this
country is itself a crime” and so “various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a
deportation hearing.”); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 1977) (“Miranda warnings are not
applicable in a deportation setting”).
53
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
54
See, e.g, California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428-430 (1971) (upholding California’s “hit and run” statute which
required drivers of cars involved in accidents to stop at the scene and provide their names and addresses because the
statute “was not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising
from automobile accidents.” “[T]he mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong policies in
favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged here.”); Baltimore City Department of Social
Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1990) (holding that a mother who refused to produce her child at the
demand of the Department of Social Services, even though the production may incriminate her in a crime, “may not
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essentially non-criminal and regulatory area” be kept and disclosed,55 a witness has “a future
intention to commit perjury . . . if granted immunity because of a claim of compulsory selfincrimination,”56 self-incriminating information will not be available to law enforcement
agencies,57 or an individual faces only foreign criminal liability.58 The threshold for Fifth
Amendment incrimination is met where compliance with a registration act “will significantly
enhance the likelihood” of prosecution for future acts, and will “readily provide evidence which
will facilitate” convictions.59 In John Doe’s case, a court would certainly find that knowledge of
the location of a crime victim is sufficiently incriminating.

C.

The Problem of Defining “Testimony”

invoke the privilege to resist the production order because she has assumed custodial duties related to production
and because production is required as part of a noncriminal regulatory regime.”).
55
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968). Under the “required records” doctrine, the government can
require individuals and entities to keep and disclose certain types of records. For example, the government may
require that income records be kept and disclosed in tax returns, United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927), or
that product pricing information be provided to the government under the Emergency Price Control Act, Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court has allowed disclosure requirements in “required records” cases only
where incrimination is likely. To fit within the doctrine, the records must be “customarily kept,” be of a “public
character,” and be within “an essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry.” Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 56-57.
In Marchetti, the Court reversed the petitioner’s conviction under federal wagering laws that required disclosure of
illegal gambling, reasoning that “[t]he United States’ principle interest is evidently the collection of revenue, and not
the punishment of gamblers; but the characteristics of the activities about which information is sought, and the
composition of the groups to which inquiries are made, readily distinguish this situation from that in Shapiro”
because the requirements “are directed to a selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.” Id. at 58
(internal citation omitted). See also Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (reversing a conviction under the
National Firearms Act which required registration of illegal weapons because “[t]he hazards of incrimination created
by the registration requirement [are] ‘real and appreciable.’”).
56
United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980).
57
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 606 (1971) (reversing the dismissal of an indictment for possession of
unregistered hand grenades; the registration statute did not violate the Fifth Amendment because any risk of
incrimination was “merely ‘trifling or imaginary’” and not “substantial and real.”).
58
Compare Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 78 (1964) (“the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness
against incrimination under state as well as federal law”), with United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 669-70 (1998)
(holding that a suspected Nazi war criminal may not invoke the right against compelled self-incrimination where his
responses to questions would not subject him to prosecution under domestic law but may make him vulnerable to
criminal prosecution in Lithuania, Israel, and Germany because “concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the
scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”).
59
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968).
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The third component of a self-incrimination violation is testimony,60 and here is where
most of the modern theoretical problems lie. The Court has failed to provide a definition of
“testimony” that can explain its own cases. This has led the commentators to wonderfully
interesting, but uniformly unconvincing, speculation as to what might explain the Fifth
Amendment. We discuss here the problems posed for both the Court and the commentators by
the absence of a plausible conception of “testimony.” In the next section we solve the riddle by
showing that testimony, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, is the substantive results of
cognition, and further that this explains both the cases and the polygraph hypothetical.
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court made an explicit effort to define the
parameters of “testimony”.61 The defendant in Schmerber appealed his conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol on the grounds that his right against self-incrimination had been
violated when the police ordered a hospital physician to extract the defendant’s blood despite the
defendant’s refusal to consent.62 A lab test indicated intoxication and was later admitted in
evidence at trial.63 The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that “the privilege
protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide
the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of
blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.”64
The Court acknowledged that the distinction between “testimony” and “real or physical
evidence” is not always easily drawn.65 A polygraph test, according to the Court, will measure
physiological changes during an interrogation and thus the results could be construed as physical
60

See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“It is also clear that the Fifth Amendment does not
independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the
accused is compelled to make a Testimonial Communication that is incriminating.”).
61
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
62
Id. at 758-59.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 761.
65
Id. at 764.
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or real, like the blood-alcohol test at issue in Schmerber.66 Without remedying this obvious flaw
in the theory, the Court simply asserted that “[t]o compel a person to submit to testing in which
an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological
responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.”67
The Court did not find any of the same concerns in the blood test under consideration, but
provided no explanation for why that is so.68 Seventeen years later, the Court still did little more
than note the polygraph problem when it considered the testimonial/physical distinction in South
Dakota v. Neville.69

The Court again concluded without explanation that although the lie

detector test seeks to obtain physical evidence, “to compel a person to submit to such testing ‘is
to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.’”70 The problem is obvious: the very
test that the Court advances, which is to distinguish between “testimony” and “real or physical
evidence,” does not provide answers as to which is which.
Consider whether anything that was forcefully taken from Doe is “testimonial.”71 The
only things extracted and presented to the jury were his heart rate, blood pressure, rate of
breathing, and electrodermal responses.

The physical data obtained through a scientific

procedure seems analogous to the blood extracted and tested in Schmerber.

If there is a

difference, the testimonial/real distinction does not get at it. The test was designed for, and
succeeded in, excluding physical exemplars72 and medical extractions73 from Fifth Amendment
protection, but it fails to explain the reoccurring specter of the polygraph.

66

Id.
Id.
68
Id. at 765.
69
459 U.S. 553, 562 n.12 (1983).
70
Id. (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764).
71
See supra pp. xx-xx.
72
See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980) (handwriting exemplar); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1 (1973) (voice exemplar); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplar); United States v.
67
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Commentators have tried unsuccessfully to rectify this gap.74 One approach has focused
on privacy as the core value that should be taken as an indicator of “testimony.”75 Whether or
not privacy is a core Fifth Amendment value, it obviously cannot explain why the privilege
applies when it does. A privacy interest would obviously include the right to exclude the
government from what’s inside one’s body, like the blood taken in Schmerber.76 In an effort to
avoid this point, Professor Arenella argued that perhaps “mental privacy,” as distinguished from
physical privacy, is “at the heart of the privilege.”77 He used both psychological examinations
and the polygraph as a demonstration of “the futility of trying to separate one’s definition of
what constitutes testimony for fifth amendment purposes from one’s view of the core values that
are impaired by permitting testimonial compulsion.”78 Assuming that the “privilege’s primary
objective is to prevent the state from intruding upon the individual’s mental privacy,” Arenella
concluded that the privilege should apply where the “state forces the accused to disclose
involuntarily his private thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about the crime charged and then
proposes to make testimonial use of these extracted thoughts.”79

His mental-privacy-plus-

Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (voice exemplar); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting exemplar);
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (holding that a defendant may be compelled to try on a blouse).
73
See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
74
For comprehensive evaluations of the many proposed theories, see Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra
note xx; David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self- Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1063 (1986); Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation--And the Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, 78 J.CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 711-18 (1988); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968).
75
See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 485 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“the Fifth Amendment
protects an individual citizen against the compelled production of testimonial matter that might tend to incriminate
him, provided it is matter that comes within the zone of privacy recognized by the Amendment to secure to the
individual ‘a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought.’”) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 327 (1973)); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 778 (1966) (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“Thus, the Fifth Amendment marks
‘a zone of privacy’ which the Government may not force a person to surrender.”).
76
Arenella, supra note xx, at 40-41 (“While privacy concerns may justify the privilege’s prohibition of testimonial
compulsion, they do not explain why the state may extract physical evidence from the accused. . . . When the state
uses compulsion to extract physical evidence from a suspect and then uses that evidence against him, the state
intrudes upon the individual’s privacy by gaining physical access to his body and securing information about him.”).
77
Id. at 40-42, cited in Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1234 n.18.
78
Id. at 42 n.63, 44.
79
Id. at 43-44 (emphasis in original).
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testimonial-use test seems to give the right answer in the case of John Doe’s polygraph test. His
theory, however, cannot overcome the other main problem of privacy-based theories.
The most serious difficulty for the theory that privacy is the explanatory variable is that
the present state of the Fifth Amendment in no way responds to it. It is indisputable that the
government has “a right to every man’s evidence,” if that evidence incriminates another person,
such as a friend or a family member.80 The state can even compel self-incriminating testimony
with a grant of immunity.81 Given these powers of the government to demand evidence from
every area of our personal lives, it is hard to see how privacy can be a guidepost for identifying
where the right against self-incrimination applies.82 These governmental powers also explain the
failure of theories based on personal autonomy, a variation on privacy theories.83
Arenella asserted that this problem disappears “once one recognizes that the privilege
only protects against invasions of mental privacy that impair accusatorial process values.”84 By
this he presumably means that the “accusatorial process norms” that are also core values of the
privilege, namely things like the “preference for an accusatorial system and fair state-individual
balance,” explain why the privilege does not apply when immunity is granted or when
information is sought against a third person.85 The difficulty here is that the argument is ad hoc.
To explain the cases, it asserts that, when privacy does not work, some other norm trumps it. But

80

See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (recognizing that the “general common-law principle that
the public has a right to every man’s evidence” is considered an indubitable certainty) (internal quotations omitted).
81
See id. at 445 (recognizing that immunity statutes “have historical roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence”)
(citing L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 328, 495 (1968)).
82
See Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1233-34 (“There are, however, two major stumbling
blocks to a privacy theory of the privilege. First, the privilege does not protect physical evidence, but instead
prohibits only compelled “testimonial” or “communicative” conduct. . . . The second problem is more devastating.
The privilege applies only to testimony that is incriminating.”); Robert S. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: SelfIncrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343, 388 (1979) (there is a “incoherence
between the focus of privacy and the Fifth Amendment’s obvious preoccupation with self-incrimination”), quoted in
Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
83
See Stuntz, Self-incrimination and Excuse, supra note xx, at 1234-35.
84
Arenella, supra note xx, at 44 n.70.
85
Id. at 40, 40 n.58.
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why? And how will one predict what the next case will bring? In essence, another “value” is
added to describe each seemingly contradictory case.
Professor Michael Dann tried a different angle for a privacy-focused analysis in his
criticisms of the testimonial/real distinction.86 He hypothesized that the protection of “one’s
mental and emotional state including personal thoughts, beliefs, ideas, and information” is the
“raison d’etre” for the Fifth Amendment privilege.87 A violation of the privilege could be
detected, he argued, where “psychologically intrusive compulsion occurred.”88 Dann was right
to look to the nature of the suspect’s involvement rather than whether the character of the
information derived was real or testimonial. His theory, however, fails to explain the cases.
Dann’s reason for looking to whether “psychologically intrusive compulsion” has
occurred is to discover if the “accused can or cannot reasonably believe that he can affect the
result” of the disclosure.89

If this belief is possible, then the accused will suffer the

“psychological pain occasioned by forcing an accused” into “the trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt.”90

This argument based on psychological cruelty generally has been

rejected.91 Dann was concerned not only about the “psychological pain” of the individual,

86

See B. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence
from a Suspect, 43 U.S.C. L. REV. 597, 598 (1970). Professors Robert Gerstein and Samuel Alito have presented
variations on this same argument. See Gerstein, supra note 33, at 346 n.17 (“What makes an act testimonial is the
fact-finder’s reliance upon the actor’s oral responsibility for truthtelling in making use of its as evidence. This, in
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though, but also about the likelihood that the person who “has the power to alter the evidence”
will actually choose to do so and thus undermine the truth-seeking function of criminal
investigations and trials.92
The focus on choice has practical allure because it can ground the privilege in the
unassailable goal of promoting the use of reliable evidence in solving and prosecuting crimes.
The privilege would apply when the witness produces evidence after having the opportunity to
choose whether to do so honestly. There are strong policy reasons for not wanting to rely on the
evidence from someone who has an incentive to hide the truth. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, Justice
Brennan wrote for a majority that “[w]henever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to
communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the
‘trilemma’ of truth, falsity, or silence, and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity)
contains a testimonial component.”93 [Moved to FN 84]
In an interesting reworking of the choice theory, Professor Stuntz, suggested that the
Fifth Amendment can be explained as an excuse theory.94 “The central principle underlying
[excuse] doctrines is that absent a compelling reason to do otherwise,” he explained, “people
should not be held to a standard higher than that which their judges can meet.”95 In the Fifth
Amendment context, if “even honest people would commit perjury when asked under oath to
confess to criminal conduct, then a serious argument for excusing perjury in such cases would
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exist.”96 Since there are serious policy problems that would result from excusing perjury, he
concludes, silence rather than perjury is immunized under the privilege.97
Under Stuntz’s excuse theory, silence is immunized when the person is in a situation in
which “even honest people” may be tempted to commit perjury.98 This is similar to the choice or
truthtelling theories to the effect that criminal trials should not rely on the compelled testimony
of someone with a significant incentive to lie. Stuntz’s theory does a better job of explaining
why we immunize silence in criminal cases but allow a defendant with an incentive to lie to
voluntarily testify in his own defense. Still, his theory fails to explain both the lie detector
hypothetical and a number of the cases.
As Arenella pointed out, a theory based on choice cannot explain our John Doe
hypothetical.99 Doe did not implicate himself after a “cruel” decision was put to him. Rather,
the officers were able to extract from him the evidence they needed without his cooperation. He
engaged in no “volitional acts” and had no “power to alter the evidence.”100 “Since an effective
and reliable lie detector test deprives the individual of any opportunity to deceive the
questioner,” Arenella explained, its results might be admissible under a choice-based theory.101
The “truthtelling” inquiry, even under Stuntz’s theory, fails because “there is no falsehood to
excuse and therefore no need to immunize noncooperation.”102
More tellingly, these theories fail to explain both the exemplar and the subpoena cases.
The Court has not extended the privilege to cases where an individual is compelled to give an
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example of his handwriting, the way he talks, or how he looks in a particular piece of clothing.103
Dann acknowledged that under his theory there should be Fifth Amendment protection in
exemplar and demonstration cases,104 though this is inconsistent with cases.
Stuntz tried to explain away the problem:
Handwriting and voice samples can be altered, so that if alteration were excusable
for the same reason as self-protective perjury, noncooperation with the police
ought to be immunized. On the other hand, it may be that handwriting and voice
exemplars are outside the scope of the privilege because plausible alteration,
while possible, is very difficult.105
Dann explained why this doesn’t avoid the problem:
It should not be determinative that “deceit is improbable” in the giving of a voice
or handwriting sample since such evidence can be disguised. Even though the
deceit is successful for only some “talented” people, only some people are able to
lie successfully. Such a distinction, however, is irrelevant. . . . As long as there is
any possibility of successful deceit, the average person, talented or not, will have
to decide whether to attempt to disguise the sample; this is precisely the trilemma
the privilege seeks to guard against.106
Nor do these theories explain the subpoena cases like Fisher. Plainly a person required to
disgorge possibility incriminating documents has choice and would have the incentive to
adulterate their contents by purging any incriminatory material, for example, and yet immunity is
limited to the act of production.107 The polygraph test and exemplar cases all create problems for
the current theories of the Fifth Amendment. Privacy- and choice-based theories fail to properly
predict the outcome of cases. The next section presents a theory that can explain all of the cases.
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D.

A Comprehensive Theory of the Fifth Amendment Privilege

As we have been suggesting throughout the earlier sections of this article, a simple
correction to the understanding of “testimony” produces an explanation of all the cases. In the
cases, “testimony” means substantive cognition—the product of cognition that results in holding
or asserting propositions with truth-value. Although never expressly formulating a cognitionbased test, the Court has acknowledged that “[i]t is the ‘extortion of information from the
accused,’ the attempt to force him ‘to disclose the contents of his own mind,’ that implicates the
Self-Incrimination Clause.”108 It has never gone the further step, however, to develop explicitly
a test based on this observation, but functionally it is precisely what the Court has been doing.109
This leads to the following explanation or theory: The government may not compel revelation of
the incriminating substantive results of cognition caused by the state.
Cognition “involves the acquisition, storage, retrieval, and use of knowledge.”110 We use
the term here to refer to these intellectual processes that allow one to gain and make use of
substantive knowledge and to compare one’s “inner world” (previous knowledge) with the
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“outside world” (including stimuli, such as a question from an interrogator).111 Excluded are
simple psychological responses to stimuli such as fear, warmness, and hunger; the mental
processes that produce muscular movements; and one’s will or faculty for choice.
It is important to note that state action is required to trigger both the cognition and the
disclosure of the results. There would be nothing objectionable about the police compelling a
suspect to think about whether he was guilty if the conclusion was never elicited or was
disclosed voluntarily. Obversely, even when cognition is involved in the original creation of
documents, their contents are not directly protected.112 The state must cause the cognition, such
as that involved in responding to a subpoena, before the Fifth Amendment is implicated. We
discuss below how the contents of voluntarily made documents may enjoy derivative protection
under Hubbell.113 Still, the direct protection extends only to the cognition caused by the state,
the paradigmatic example being the retrieval of information from memory in response to a
question. Finally, only the incriminating substantive results of cognition are protected from
compelled disclosure.

The fact or quality of cognition is not protected but only those

propositions with truth-value that would tend to incriminate the author.
Our theory of the Self-Incrimination Clause—that the government may not compel
revelation of the incriminating substantive results of cognition—can explain all of the cases. As
in all theories of the Fifth Amendment, the variables of compulsion114 and incrimination will
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exclude some cases from protection categorically, and others when the judicially-created
threshold is not met. However, the cases that are problematic for other theories can be explained
by ours, as can the polygraph hypothetical.
In John Doe’s case, the government would be prohibited from using the polygraph results
of the unspeaking suspect. The officer asking questions caused Doe to engage in cognition.
Though he made no oral responses, his differing physiological responses to suggestions about the
location of the little girl are a by-product of those thoughts; indeed, the evidence of responses
would be relevant only if they were a reliable code—a language, in other words—of those
thoughts. The officer’s questions caused Doe (outside stimuli) to retrieve his own previous
knowledge and arrive at answers to the questions. Despite Doe’s stubborn resistance, the officer
also compelled the revelation of the substantive results of this cognition by capturing Doe’s
physiological responses that are a code for his thoughts. Since the substantive content of his
thoughts, as reported through those physiological responses, was incriminating, the privilege
should apply.
The same analysis applies to psychological examinations.

Plainly, the information

extracted could be considered medical like the blood in Schmerber, but still the privilege is
implicated.115 The patient is compelled to compare the meaning of the doctor’s statements with
his own knowledge and experiences and to arrive at incriminating substantive answers which are
then extracted through compulsion. In the cases to date, the Court has concluded that those
answers would be used substantively. In Estelle v. Smith, the Court “specifically rejected the
115
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claim that the psychiatrist [in a court-ordered examination] was observing the patient’s
communications simply to infer facts of his mind, rather than to examine the truth of the
patient’s statements.”116 The Court rejected the state’s argument that the Fifth Amendment was
inapposite because the defendant’s communications to the doctor were “nontestimonial in
nature”:
However, Dr. Grigson’s diagnosis, as detailed in his testimony, was not based
simply on his observation of respondent. Rather, Dr. Grigson drew his
conclusions largely from respondent’s account of the crime during their interview,
and he placed particular emphasis on what he considered to be respondent’s lack
of remorse. Dr. Grigson’s prognosis as to future dangerousness rested on
statements respondent made, and remarks he omitted, in reciting the details of the
crime. The Fifth Amendment privilege, therefore, is directly involved here
because the State used as evidence against respondent the substance of his
disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric examination.117

Since the substantive results of cognition were compelled and incriminating, the Fifth
Amendment was violated. This is precisely as our theory predicts. We also predict, however,
that psychological exams that carry no risk of using substantive responses to questions as
substantive evidence against the accused would not violate the Fifth Amendment.
Consistent with the holding of Schmerber, medical tests are not privileged under this
theory.

Schmerber can be restated in terms of cognition.

In standard medical exams a

patient/suspect is not compelled to engage in cognition at all and the test results do not reveal
any knowledge or substantive results of cognition. The tests could presumably be performed on
a totally non-thinking individual.

Although the testimonial/real analysis cannot make the

necessary distinction between medical and psychological tests, the cognition test shows that only
the latter should be protected because even the completely uncooperative suspect can be
compelled to reveal the incriminating substantive results of compelled cognition.
116
117
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Exemplar cases also can be explained. These cases do not trigger the privilege because,
though the person must understand the command and respond accordingly (comparing the
outside stimulus with his previous knowledge), no substantive knowledge is dislodged. When
one only has to present or refrain from hiding personal characteristics, there is no disclosure of
the results of cognition. Signing one’s name or trying on a blouse involves some mental effort in
understanding the directions and complying with them. Still, there is no revelation of the
substantive results of cognition. All that is revealed is the use of the will or faculty of deliberate
action to follow directions in signing one’s name normally. There is no assertion disclosed, only
the decision to not let one’s will interfere with the naturalness of the response. This decision is a
choice and this point highlights the important difference between a cognition-based theory and
one that relies on the presence of choice. Choice theories get exemplar cases wrong.118
The Court’s decision in United States v. Doe (Doe II) further demonstrates this point.119
There, a court order compelled a target of a grand jury investigation to authorize foreign banks to
disclose records of his accounts.120 The target was compelled to sign a form that “purported to
apply to any and all accounts over which Doe had a right of withdrawal, without acknowledging
the existence of any such account.”121 The Court analogized the demand to exemplar cases and
explained:
We do not disagree with the dissent that “[t]he expression of the contents of an
individual’s mind” is testimonial for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. . . . We
simply disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that the execution of the consent
directive at issue here forced petitioner to express the contents of his mind. In our
view, such compulsion is more like “be[ing] forced to surrender a key to a
strongbox containing incriminating documents” than it is like “be[ing] compelled
to reveal the combination to [petitioner’s] wall safe.”122
118
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The Court concluded that because the consent directive was not “testimonial in nature,” “the
District Court’s order compelling petitioner to sign the directive does not violate his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.”123 In Doe II, as in exemplar cases, the target
had to use his will or faculty of deliberate action to follow directions in signing his name.
Complying with the order, however, did not require Doe to disclose the substantive results of
cognition.124
Finally, the act of production cases also can be explained. All subpoenas for documents
or other tangible evidence involve cognition.

The government, through its issuance of a

subpoena, causes cognition through the recipient reading the subpoena, comparing its language
with his own knowledge, and arriving at substantive answers as to which documents satisfy the
terms of the subpoena. The government then, through a grant of immunity or threat of contempt,
compels the disclosure of the incriminating substantive results of that compelled cognition.
However, the act of production cases do pose unanswered questions about the development of
the Fifth Amendment. We turn to these questions in the following section.
Perhaps the only datum not obviously explained by our theory is the sixth birthday
question in Pennsylvania v. Muniz,125 but it, too, is consistent. In Muniz, a drunk -driving suspect
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was arrested and taken to a police station where he was told that his actions and voice would be
recorded on video, but he was not advised of his Miranda rights.126 This exchange followed:
Officer Hosterman first asked Muniz his name, address, height, weight, eye color,
date of birth, and current age.
He responded to each of these questions,
stumbling over his address and age. The officer then asked Muniz, “Do you
know what the date was of your sixth birthday?” After Muniz offered an
inaudible reply, the officer repeated, “When you turned six years old, do you
remember what the date was?” Muniz responded, “No, I don’t.”127
Following this discussion, the police officers performed three sobriety tests that had also been
done on the roadside.128

The suspect made several incriminating statements reflecting his

inability to follow directions while trying to perform these tests.129

The Court considered

whether any of the suspect’s “utterances” constituted “testimonial responses to custodial
interrogation for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause.”130 The Court delivered a complex
web of opinions. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, representing four votes.131 Justice
Rehnquist also represented four votes, joining Brennan’s opinion on some issues and dissenting
on others.132 Finally, Justice Marshall wrote only for himself, and though providing an important
vote for the plurality, presented reasoning different from all eight other Justices.
Eight Justices agreed that “any verbal statements that were both testimonial in nature and
elicited during custodial interrogation should be suppressed” because of the failure by the police
to advise the suspect of his Miranda rights.133 These same eight all agreed that “[r]equiring a
suspect to reveal the physical manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to reveal
the physical properties of the sound produced by his voice, does not, without more, compel him
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to provide a ‘testimonial’ response for purposes of the privilege.”134 Citing several exemplar
cases, the Court held that the fact that the suspect slurred his speech was not protected.135 The
sobriety tests were also held to be permissible under Schmerber and the statements made during
the sobriety tests were found to be “voluntary” under Neville since the police did nothing to
solicit the statements.136 This is all consistent with our theory.
With regard to the first seven questions eliciting the suspect’s name, address, height,
weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age, Justice Brennan, with four votes, asserted that
the statements and their delivery need not be suppressed because they fall within the routine
booking exception.137 Rehnquist’s four found that the statements needn’t be suppressed because
they were not “testimonial.”138
suppressed.139

Only Justice Marshall felt the statements should be

Again, the decision not to suppress these statements is consistent with our

theory—no substantive products of cognition were being extracted to be used against the
defendant.
The most contentious issue was the sixth birthday question, and it is also the greatest
challenge to us. Justice Brennan, still representing four votes, found this to be different from the
first seven questions because it “was incriminating, not just because of his delivery, but also
because of his answer’s content; the trier of fact could infer from Muniz’s answer (that he did not
know the proper date) that his mental state was confused.”140

The questions “required a
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testimonial response” that the state “cared about.”141

Justice Rehnquist’s four dissenters,

disagreed:
If the police may require Muniz to use his body in order to demonstrate the level
of his physical coordination, there is no reason why they should not be able to
require him to speak or write in order to determine his mental coordination. That
was all that was sought here. Since it was permissible for the police to extract
and examine a sample of Schmerber’s blood to determine how much that part of
his system had been affected by alcohol, I see no reason why they may not
examine the functioning of Muniz’s mental processes for the same purpose.142

Justice Marshall cast the deciding vote by concurring with Justice Brennan’s opinion that
“the ‘sixth birthday question’ required a testimonial response from respondent Muniz.”143
Before concluding that the Court held that Muniz’s response to the sixth birthday question was
testimonial, however, it is necessary to look more closely at Marshall’s concurrence.

His

reasoning that differs so dramatically from that of all eight other Justices reveals that the sixth
birthday question was never decided by a majority of the Court.
Justice Marshall reasoned that everything Mr. Muniz said or did was in the context of
custodial questioning, and since no Miranda warning was given, all of his incriminating actions
and statements should have been suppressed.144 Thus, Marshall implicitly agreed with the
dissenters that no distinction should be drawn between the first seven questions as to Mr.
Muniz’s name, address, height, etc., the sobriety tests, and the “sixth birthday question,” though
he disagreed about the consequence of this conclusion.145 More importantly, his concurrence
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reveals the hollowness of his assertion that everything said or done in front of the police officers
was testimonial. He admitted:
I continue to have serious reservations about the Court’s limitation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to “testimonial” evidence. See United States v. Mara, 410
U.S. 19, 32-38 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I believe that privilege extends
to any evidence that a person is compelled to furnish against himself. At the very
least, the privilege includes evidence that can be obtained only through the
person’s affirmative cooperation. Of course, a person’s refusal to incriminate
himself also cannot be used against him.146
Marshall wrote that, if Muniz had raised the issue, he would have found that even Muniz’s
performance of the sobriety tests and his refusal to take the breathalyzer examination violate the
Fifth Amendment.147

The videotape showing these things should have been suppress, he

argued.148
Though Marshall cooperatively labeled everything “testimonial” to reach the desired
result, he explicitly stated in his concurrence that he thought that “[t]he far better course would
be to maintain the clarity of the doctrine by requiring police to preface all direct questioning of a
suspect with Miranda warnings” regardless of the type of evidence elicited.149 The rule should
apply, he urged, when the police delayed processing Mr. Muniz for the purpose of observing
him, even though no questions were asked, because his actions and statements during this time
were likely to be incriminating.150 The rule also should apply when Mr. Muniz counted to six
rather than to thirty as he was instructed, because “his failure to complete the count was
incriminating in itself.”151 Marshall called all of these things “testimonial” so that as many of
them as possible would be suppressed within the framework adopted by the rest of the Court.
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Although Marshall stated that the sixth birthday question is testimonial, his vote on this issue is
undermined by his failure to agree with Brennan about the distinction between this question and
the sobriety tests. Marshall’s concurrence should be read as a vote for bolstering the Miranda
prophylactic rule, and not as a vote on the competing theories of the testimonial/physical
evidence distinction.
A holding of the Court that the sixth birthday question violates the Fifth Amendment
would be inconsistent with our theory (although note that it is the only case that we would not be
able to explain as compared to other theories that have considerably greater problems in this
regard). It is true that cognition is involved in knowing one’s birthday but the revelation of the
substantive knowledge is not incriminating. The fact that the suspect had difficulty making the
calculation reveals nothing about his perceptions or ideas or the knowledge he has derived from
them. Incrimination as to the fact of cognition, or the facility or mental dexterity with which one
engages in cognition, is instead analogous to blood tests. The privilege does not protect the fact
or quality of cognition, but only those substantive results that would tend to incriminate the
author. Only if Muniz had answered the question, and the content of that answer was somehow
incriminating, should the privilege have applied.
However, the Court did not hold that the sixth birthday question violated the Fifth
Amendment. That position only received four votes; Justice Marshall’s concurrence should be
understood as only considering whether the question violated Miranda, which has a broader
scope than the actual Fifth Amendment protection.152 To be sure, the Muniz Court came close to
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making a mistake, but did not. As cases get close to any line, it is not surprising to see opinions
splinter; that is what we suggest occurred in Muniz. We also predict the line will not be breached
in the future. Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in Muniz is inconsistent with the Court’s
previous, and later, holdings. Never before or since has the Court held that a physical or
psychological process deserves protection independent of its substantive results.

II.

The Remaining Ambiguities: Thresholds for Cognition and the Extent of Derivative
Use
As the previous section demonstrated, notwithstanding all the hand wringing over the

chaotic state of Fifth Amendment theory, the cases are quite consistent and explained by a fairly
simple theory. Three years ago, however, the Court handed down what appeared to be a highly
technical result, but which in fact had explosive potential—so explosive that if developed it
could essentially mean the end of subpoenas to targets of criminal investigations. This was
United States v. Hubbell.153 Interestingly, what makes Hubbell so potentially significant is the
possibility that it embraces precisely the theory we have laid out in this article, and carries it to
its logical extension by bringing all derivative evidence within its scope. The Court’s opinion
was in the vocabulary of traditional Fifth Amendment case law, and the case purported to be
nothing more than an application of the Fisher act of production doctrine.154

The Court

essentially held, however, that anything produced from compelled cognition that itself was
protected, would be immunized under the Fifth Amendment. This seems to reverse Fisher’s
conclusion that, at least in the context of subpoenas, the compelled cognition, but not its fruits,
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would be immunized.155 We say “seems” because there is an alternative explanation that may
explain the two cases: perhaps the Court will conceive of cognition, like compulsion and
incrimination, as a variable with a threshold that must be passed before the Fifth Amendment is
violated. These are the remaining sources of ambiguity. We elaborate on them in this section,
and explain how they arose. In the next section, we present the Court’s options and predict what
it is likely to do.
In the act of production cases, the Court has flirted with various ways of limiting the
reach of “testimony,” but never has arrived at a satisfactory answer or comprehensible
explanation. Professor Cole lamented that in Fisher and the later act of production doctrine
cases, the Court “declined to articulate a test of general application that the lower courts could
use to assess the testimonial value of the act of producing documents.”156 This is because a
consistent “testimonial communications” test cannot be articulated given the Court’s
understanding of the term. By contrast, cognition as a test of this third component permits a
threshold to be set to exclude some cases from protection. We elaborate these points here. First,
we explicate the crooked path from Fisher to Hubbell and its significance for the reach of the
Fifth Amendment. We then show how cognition is the key to understanding the progression.

155

Justice O’Connor expressed the view that the fruits of a “mere” Miranda violation need not be suppressed. See
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660-74 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor made it clear that
though evidence derived from Miranda violations is properly admissible, derivative evidence from actual Fifth
Amendment violations should be suppressed. “The values underlying the privilege may justify exclusion of an
unwarned person’s out-of-court statements, as perhaps they may justify exclusion of statements and derivative
evidence compelled under the threat of contempt. But when the only evidence to be admitted is derivative evidence
such as a gun—derived not from actual compulsion but from a statement taken in the absence of Miranda
warnings—those values simply cannot require suppression, at least no more so than they would for other such
nontestimonial evidence.” Id. at 671 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Fisher suggested that, in the context of document
subpoenas, the fruits are never immunized. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. United States v. Doe (Doe II) made it clear
that the content of subpoenaed documents are not protected. 487 U.S. 201, 206 (1988) (“It is undisputed that the
contents of the foreign bank records sought by the Government are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment.”)
(citing Fisher, among other cases).
156
Cole, supra note xx, at 149, 162.

38

In United States v. Fisher, the Court concluded that the act of producing things demanded
by the government through subpoenas may merit Fifth Amendment protection.157 In Fisher, the
Court addressed whether a summons demanding production of documents created by an
accountant for a taxpayer could be resisted on Fifth Amendment grounds.158 The Court found
that the content of subpoenaed documents was not protected but that “[t]he act of producing
evidence in response to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly
aside from the contents of the papers produced.”159 “Compliance with the subpoena tacitly
concedes” the existence, possession or control, and authenticity of the documents delivered.160
The Court held, however, that compliance with the summons in the case at hand “would involve
no incriminating testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment.”161
In reaching this conclusion, the Court revealed its concern about the possible
expansiveness of the act of production doctrine.162 Without providing a satisfactory explanation
for its conclusion, the Court embraced a constricted act of production doctrine, mentioning two
aspects of the case that presumably affected the outcome. First, compliance with the subpoena
was not “testimony” because the papers were not the defendant’s “private papers” but rather had
been created by an accountant. This fact is meant to distinguish Fisher from Boyd v. United
States.163 In Boyd, the Court announced a very broad privilege for individuals’ “private books
and papers.”164 Since the Boyd Court included within this protection a subpoenaed business
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invoice, this is hardly a persuasive distinction.165 In fact, Justice White, writing for the majority,
stated dismissively that “[s]everal of Boyd’s express or implicit declarations have not stood the
test of time.”166 Justice O’Connor and others have since stated that Fisher “sounded the deathknell for Boyd.”167 The holding in Fisher narrowed the scope of the privilege dramatically from
what essentially had been a broad “zone of privacy” recognized in Boyd.168
The second factor affecting Fisher’s outcome, according to the Court, was that the
“existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or
nothing to the sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has the
papers.” 169 This also effectively limited the scope of “testimony,” and thus of the reach of the
Fifth Amendment, but it left unclear what precisely would be protected.170 Were these necessary
or sufficient conditions? If the former, how did they interact? If the latter, what was the scope of
the “foregone conclusion” rationale? Indeed, commentators thought that perhaps the real point
of Fisher was to bring an end to the Boyd era, and not simply to extend it through a different
vocabulary.171
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In United States v. Doe (Doe I), the Court for the first time, and to the surprise of many,
upheld the invocation of the privilege based on the act of production, thus indicating that the
reports of Boyd’s demise were greatly exaggerated.172 The owner of several sole proprietorships
received subpoenas requiring production of several categories of business documents.173 The
owner’s motion to quash was granted by the District Court upon a finding “that the act of
production would compel respondent to “admit that the records exist, that they are in his
possession, and that they are authentic.”174 The Supreme Court deferred to the lower court’s
“determination of factual issues” and affirmed the granting of the motion.175
The Court’s decisions in the years following Doe I gave a curious gloss to the act of
production doctrine. It emphasized that “in order to be ‘testimonial,’ an accused’s oral or written
communication, or act, must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information.”176 Yet, in two cases where clearly incriminating communications were at issue,
the Court seemed to find the privilege inapplicable. In Braswell v. United States, the Court
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s holding that “Braswell, as custodian of corporate documents, has no
act of production privilege under the fifth amendment regarding corporate documents” and thus
“may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds.”177 The Court
distinguished Doe I:
Had petitioner conducted his business as a sole proprietorship, Doe would require
that he be provided the opportunity to show that his act of production would entail
testimonial self-incrimination. But petitioner has operated his business through
the corporate form, and we have long recognized that, for purposes of the Fifth
172
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Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated differently from
individuals. This doctrine—known as the collective entity rule—has a lengthy
and distinguished pedigree.178
The petitioner in Braswell was the sole shareholder of his two companies and he, his wife, and
his mother, were the only directors.179 His wife and mother held the positions of secretarytreasurer and vice-president of the corporations, respectively, and “neither ha[d] any authority
over the business affairs of either corporation.”180 Thus, the Court seems to say that a person
may not invoke the privilege, even if the production would be “personally incriminating,” if he
has chosen one corporate form over another.181 This disturbingly formalistic approach led the
dissent to criticize the majority for being “captive to its own fictions.”182
Braswell was another unpersuasive effort to limit the privilege, as ironically the majority
itself seemed to admit. Despite the unequivocal statement that the act of production would
afford corporate custodians no Fifth Amendment protection, the Court undid its entire opinion in
a last qualifying paragraph:
Although a corporate custodian is not entitled to resist a subpoena on the ground
that his act of production will be personally incriminating, we do think certain
consequences flow from the fact that the custodian’s act of production is one in
his representative rather than personal capacity. Because the custodian acts as a
representative, the act is deemed one of the corporation and not the individual.
Therefore, the Government concedes, as it must, that it may make no evidentiary
use of the “individual act” against the individual. For example, in a criminal
prosecution against the custodian, the Government may not introduce into
evidence before the jury the fact that the subpoena was served upon and the
corporation’s documents were delivered by one particular individual, the
custodian.183
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This amounts to an implicit grant of use immunity: in a criminal trial, the custodian’s act of
production cannot be used against him personally. If the privilege applies, why did the Court
state that “Braswell, as custodian of corporate documents, has no act of production privilege
under the fifth amendment”?184 As Justice Kennedy commented, “[t]his exercise admits what
the Court denied in the first place, namely, that compelled compliance with the subpoena
implicates the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege.”185
The Court revealed this same uncertainty about applying the act of production doctrine in
Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight.186 After holding that a mother may
not invoke the Fifth Amendment to resist a court order to produce her child, whom authorities
feared had been abused and possibly killed, the Court again ended its opinion with a cryptic
qualification:
We are not called upon to define the precise limitations that may exist upon the
State’s ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight’s act of production in
subsequent criminal proceedings. But we note that imposition of such limitations
is not foreclosed. The same custodial role that limited the ability to resist the
production order may give rise to corresponding limitations upon the direct and
indirect use of that testimony.187
As in Braswell, the Court concluded that the State was not required to grant immunity ex
ante but implied that ex post it might, thus leaving the state of the law unclear.188 The puzzles
are obvious. First, the cases may have produced a judicially-created form of immunity, not
constrained by statute, which can be recognized ex post by judges evaluating a prosecutor’s
proposed use of the evidence. It seems unlikely that this was the Court’s intent, however, given
that in its earlier decision in Doe I, it declined to adopt a “doctrine of constructive immunity”
184
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under which “the courts would impose a requirement on the Government not to use the
incriminatory aspects of the act of production against the person claiming the privilege even
though the statutory procedures have not been followed.”189
Alternatively, perhaps the Court was trying in Bouknight and Braswell to be faithful to
the very narrow act of production doctrine of Fisher, but stumbled because of the lack of a clear
understanding of the nature of the very distinctions the Court was attempting to draw. Through
our theory—that the government may not compel revelation of the incriminating substantive
results of compelled cognition—the debate underlying these cases can be better understood. In
both Bouknight and Braswell the government sought to compel production of evidence through a
court order. To compel such a response is to compel cognition by forcing the recipient of the
subpoena/order to read the subpoena, compare its language with his own knowledge, and arrive
at substantive answers as to which documents or physical items satisfy the terms of the order.
The government would then compel revelation of the presumably incriminating results of this
compelled cognition. The only remaining questions are whether the level of cognition meets
some threshold, and what the derivative consequences are if it does.
Some scholars have suggested that the scope of the Fifth Amendment should be confined
to explicit “testimonial use” and have little or no derivative consequences. Professor Arenella
explained that a violation would only occur, or conversely immunity should only be granted,
where the government seeks to make “testimonial use” of an actor’s “thoughts, feelings, and
beliefs.”190 Similarly, Amar and Lettow suggested an approach limiting what is presented at
trial:
[T]he Court should move beyond the way station of Kastigar and declare that a
person’s (perhaps unreliable) compelled pretrial statements can never be
189
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introduced against him in a criminal case but that reliable fruits of such statements
virtually always can be. Thus, the government should be allowed to require a
suspect to answer relevant questions in a civilized pretrial hearing presided over
by a judge or magistrate. Under penalty of contempt, a suspect must answer
truthfully, but he will be entitled to ‘testimonial immunity’: that is, the compelled
words will never be introduced over the defendant’s objection in a criminal trial –
the defendant will never be an involuntary ‘witness’ against himself ‘in’ a
‘criminal case’ – but the fruits of these compelled pretrial words will generally be
admissible.191
Amar and Lettow declared that the Court was “leaning” in this direction.192 The Supreme
Court’s conclusion in United States v. Hubbell, in an opinion with potentially astonishing
implications, is to the contrary.193
Webster Hubbell pleaded guilty to tax evasion and mail fraud in 1994 and promised, as
part of his plea agreement, to provide the Independent Counsel with “full, complete, accurate,
and truthful information” about the investigation into the Whitewater Development
Corporation.194 While Hubbell was serving his twenty-one-month sentence, the Independent
Counsel tried to determine whether the agreement to provide information had been violated by
serving Hubbell with a subpoena duces tecum calling for eleven categories of documents.195
Hubbell appeared before an Arkansas grand jury but invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege.196
The prosecutor presented a § 6003 order from the District Court, granting Hubbell immunity “to
the extent allowed by law” and ordering him to respond to the subpoena.197 Hubbell produced
13,120 pages of documents and asserted, “those were all of the documents in his custody or
control that were responsive to the commands in the subpoena . . . .”198
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In 1998 a new grand jury returned an indictment for tax-related crimes as well as mail
and wire fraud.199 Though the contents of the documents produced by Hubbell “provided the
Independent Counsel with the information that led to this second prosecution, the government
asserted that in the criminal case against Hubbell “it would not have to advert to [Hubbell’s] act
of production in order to prove the existence, authenticity, or custody” or to even “introduce any
of the documents” into evidence.200 The question before the Court was whether Hubbell’s “act
of production immunity” would pose a “significant bar” to prosecution.201 Since “the scope of
‘use and derivate-use’ immunity that [§ 6002] provides is coextensive with the scope of the
constitutional privilege,” the real issue was the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege.202 The
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the indictment.203
The Court found that the prosecution was barred from producing at trial Hubbell’s
response to the subpoena or the fact of his having produced the evidence.204 “That would surely
be a prohibited ‘use’ of the immunized act of production.”205 The Court went further, however,
and found it “clear” that the government had “already made ‘derivative use’ of the testimonial
aspect of that act in obtaining the indictment against the respondent and in preparing its case for
trial.”206 “[I]t is undeniable,” the Court wrote, “that providing a catalog of existing documents
fitting within any of the 11 broadly worded subpoena categories could provide a prosecutor with
a ‘lead to incriminating evidence,’ or ‘a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.’”207
Although the Court asserted, as it had in prior cases, that the contents of the documents were not
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privileged,208 the contents themselves did provide the link. “The contents of the documents
produced by respondent provided the Independent Counsel with the information that led to this
second prosecution.”209
In reaching its conclusion, the Court analyzed the nature of Hubbell’s actions in
responding to the subpoena.210 It observed:
It was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of “the
contents of his own mind” in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to
the requests in the subpoena. The assembly of those documents was like telling
an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like being forced to surrender the
key to a strongbox. The Government’s anemic view of respondent’s act of
production as a mere physical act that is principally nontestimonial in character
and can be entirely divorced from its “implicit” testimonial aspect so as to
constitute a “legitimate, wholly independent source” (as required by Kastigar) for
the documents produced simply fails to account for these realities.211
In other words, the Court concluded that the government had, through its issuance of a subpoena,
caused cognition when the recipient read the subpoena, compared its language with his own
knowledge, and arrived at substantive answers as to which documents satisfied the terms of the
subpoena.

The government then compelled the disclosure of the incriminating substantive

results of this compelled cognition through a grant of immunity.
The dramatic change from Fisher to Hubbell is now plain. Fisher suggested a high
threshold for cognition and a limited derivative use doctrine. A substantial use of knowledge
would be required before the privilege would apply, and the scope of immunity would be limited
to the bare act of production. The privilege’s applicability to interrogations and confessions was
unaffected because these cases necessarily involve significant use of knowledge and could
themselves be used substantively at trial.

Where the individual only had to respond
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mechanically to an order, as in Fisher, the response to subpoenas was either below the minimal
threshold for cognition, evidentially irrelevant, or some combination of the two. The Court in
Fisher implied that there might be a situation in which the act of production would involve
sufficient cognition so that the threshold would be met, although it also suggested that this would
not be common. Thus in Fisher, although the subject of the subpoena had to read, understand,
and respond to the contents of the subpoena—all of which require cognition as we use the
term—the Court concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment protection for the act of
production itself, and consequently, not for the contents of the disclosed documents. Following
Fisher, then, cognition appeared to be a variable requiring some minimal threshold, and the
scope of derivative use, while unclear, seemed constricted.
In Hubbell, the Court took a dramatic new step in concluding that no derivative use at all
could be made of the incriminating substantive results of Hubbell’s cognition. The attachment of
derivative use to the “testimony” component significantly expanded the potential scope of
protection, suggesting that the two cases are in direct tension with each other. Justices Thomas
and Scalia, concurring in Hubbell, expressed a willingness to reconsider Fisher,212 but the
majority made a half-hearted effort to distinguish the case.213 In Fisher, the Court explained, the
“existence and location of the papers” was a “foregone conclusion.”214 Without doing much to
explain their rationale, the Court simply stated that it did not apply to Hubbell’s situation.215
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If we look to the subpoenas at issue in these cases, we find no support for a categorical
distinction. In Fisher, the Court considered appeals in two cases from two Circuits. In United
States v. Kasmir, the subpoena considered by the Fifth Circuit ordered production of:
1. Accountant’s work papers pertaining to Dr. Mason’s books and records of
1969, 1970, and 1971.
2. Retained copies of Dr. Mason’s income tax returns for 1969, 1970, and 1971.
3. Retained copies of reports and other correspondence between (the accounting
firm) and Dr. Mason during 1969, 1970, and 1971. 216
In United States v. Fisher, the subpoena considered by the Third Circuit required the recipient:
‘to give testimony relating to the tax liability or the collection of the tax liability’
of Morris Goldsmith and to bring with him, among other things, an ‘Analysis of
Receipts and Disbursements for Morris Goldsmith for 1969 and 1970’ and an
‘Analysis of the Receipts and Disbursements of Sally Goldsmith for 1969 and
1970.’217
The Hubbell subpoena demanded documents in several areas including:
C. Copies of all bank records of Webster Hubbell, his wife, or children for all
accounts from January 1, 1993 to the present, including but not limited to all
statements, registers and ledgers, cancelled checks, deposit items, and wire
transfers.
D. Any and all documents reflecting, referring, or relating to time worked or
billed by Webster Hubbell from January 1, 1993 to the present, including but not
limited to original time sheets, books, notes, papers, and/or computer records.218
All three of these subpoenas require cognition. There may be differences in the quantity of
documents to be produced and the length of time it will take to gather them. Yet, each subpoena
recipient will be required to determine which documents fit the description of the subpoena. In
Kasmir, the prosecutor presumably knew that there were “accountant’s work papers” and that
they were likely in the accountant’s possession. Still, there was no “foregone conclusion” about
any particular document. The Hubbell subpoena is similar, differing only by degree.
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Commentators have given much weight to the “foregone conclusion” doctrine, arguing
that it creates a useful dichotomy.219 Acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing Fisher from
Hubbell, Cole wrote, “the difference between the two cases, if any, arises out of the application
of the ‘foregone conclusion’ doctrine.”220 Although disappointed that the Court had “declined to
provide a definitive answer,” Cole concluded that “[b]y recognizing the extent of the
Government’s prior knowledge as the critical inquiry for purposes of the application of the
foregone conclusion doctrine, the Court effectively resolved the issue of when the doctrine
should apply.”221 Proceeding to lay out the “analytical framework mandated by Hubbell,” Cole
presented a three-part test.222

The second and third phases asked about the presence of

incrimination and compulsion, respectively.223 “Phase One” of the inquiry asked “whether the
act of production has sufficient testimonial value to be protected by the Fifth Amendment, or
stated differently, whether the testimonial information that would be conveyed is a ‘foregone
conclusion’ because the government has ‘prior knowledge’ of that information.”224

In the

context of document production, Cole equated the “testimonial” component with “prior
knowledge” by the government.
Robert Mosteller, also concluded that the foregone conclusion doctrine is at the center of
the analysis.225 Mosteller interpreted Hubbell as holding that “when the prosecution does not
have specific information about the existence of incriminating documents, demanding them
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violates the Fifth Amendment.”226

He concluded that “[n]ow the important battle is the

determination of the extent of prosecutorial knowledge necessary to establish that the existence
of the documents is a ‘foregone conclusion.’”227 He joined this battle and presented a complex
hypothesis of how the foregone conclusion doctrine can work in practice.228
The “foregone conclusion” doctrine almost surely cannot sustain this weight. First, it is
hard to read the Court’s opinion as providing much support. The Court never suggests that its
holding is based on a foregone conclusion analysis, its only reference to it being the half-hearted
and rather dismissive comment that, “[w]hatever the scope of this ‘foregone conclusion’
rationale, the facts of this case plainly fall outside of it.”229 More importantly, the argument
leads to unacceptable results. If the information sought is evidentially important, then it cannot
matter how much the government already knows.230 Under Mosteller’s and Cole’s analysis, the
government could presumably compel oral confessions if it had other evidence of what the
defendant knew or would say. In John Doe’s polygraph case, there would be no violation if the
government already had the little girl’s body and substantial evidence of Doe’s guilt, but merely
wanted to solidify the case against him.
By contrast, the foregone conclusion doctrine makes more sense if it is understood as
directed toward the witness’s cognitive efforts rather than the government’s knowledge. The
doctrine does not define a difference in kind between types of subpoenas; rather, it highlights
that cognitive demands may vary between different subpoenas.

A subpoena that demands

226

Id. at 492.
Id. at 518.
228
See also Wedeles, supra note xx, at 625-26 (also proclaiming the importance of the “foregone conclusion”
doctrine).
229
Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 44.
230
Anticipating this argument, Justice Brennan commented that “I know of no Fifth Amendment principle which
makes the testimonial nature of evidence, and therefore, one’s protection against incriminating himself, turn on the
strength of the Government’s case against him.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 429 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
227

51

production of a very specific document kept in a very specific location requires very little mental
effort. The individual must only compare the language of the request to his own knowledge of
the document sought. A more vague or more wide-ranging subpoena requires greater cognitive
effort. The individual must interpret the meaning of the request, sort though large numbers of
documents, and try to determine if a variety of documents can all fit within the parameters of a
request.

III.

The Future
How Fisher and Hubbell relate—and thus the future of the Fifth Amendment—is unclear

on two fronts. First, is cognition a variable like compulsion and incrimination? In what may
prove to be the single most important word in the opinion, the Court referred to the “extensive”
effort that Hubbell had to make to respond to the subpoena.231 Perhaps less extensive efforts will
not meet the required threshold, and the location of the breaking point will be determined
through a common-law process. The second issue is the scope of derivative immunity—how far
will the causal consequences of cognition extend? These two issues may be dependent or
independent. The extensiveness of cognitive effort may result in a more extensive derivative use
protection, or the permissible derivative use may remain constant so long as the threshold of
cognition is met. These two variables point the way to the future.
There are three possible directions in which the law can evolve. First, the Court may
choose to follow Fisher in both respects. This would limit the privilege to situations where the
bare act of production is itself incriminating, and would permit derivative use. Second, the Court
may follow Hubbell in both respects. This would extend the privilege to all cases where the
substantive contents of cognition is compelled, and create a broad derivative use doctrine. Third,
231
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the Court might embrace the derivative use aspect of Hubbell and couple it with a requirement of
“extensive” cognition. Doing so would raise the related question of the relationship between the
two variables—as the extent of the compelled substantive cognition increases, does the scope of
protection for the derivative consequences increase as well?
The practical consequences of these different choices are obvious. If the Court embraces
Fisher, and comes to view Hubbell as an aberration, the privilege will be substantially curtailed
with regard to subpoenas. A reductionist view of the act of production doctrine and the nature of
a compelled act would result. All complexities and conditions would be obscured or ignored so
that a bare act would seem to carry no significance. The context of the compelled disclosure
would be shielded from view so that the government could act as though it obtained the evidence
through its own independent efforts. Following the Fisher approach, no preexisting documents
would be protected. The government would only be limited in the way that it described to a trier
of fact how it came into possession of the documents. The government could use compelled
evidence if it were treated as though it arrived like “manna from heaven,” “by assuming that it
miraculously appeared in the district attorney’s office.”232 The Fifth Amendment would be
orderly and curtailed. Where compulsion or incrimination is missing or below the required
threshold, there would be no privilege. Only where there is compulsion, incrimination, and a
high level of cognition, such as in John Doe’s polygraph case or a psychological test, would the
privilege apply. At the low end of the cognition scale, in the context of subpoenas for example,
the privilege would not apply. The government would continue to be able to use subpoenas to
compel incriminating evidence. The substance of the evidence, such as the contents of the
documents or the condition of the child in Bouknight, would not be protected.
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If Hubbell dominates the future, and every response to a subpoena is determined to
involve sufficient cognition to implicate the privilege, which in turn is coupled with
extensivederivative use protection, the scope of the Fifth Amendment will be so large as to
swallow subpoenas. Uviller recognized with dismay that Hubbell’s derivative protection “comes
perilously close to treating the contents of a document as the indirect product of its
production.”233 As the Court stated in Hubbell, it was the “contents of the documents produced
by respondent” that “provided the Independent Counsel with the information that led to his
second prosecution.”234

But this means that no subpoena can be enforced over a Fifth

Amendment objection without a grant of immunity. The grant of immunity in turn would make
it next to impossible to prosecute the subject of a subpoena.235
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If the Court chooses to follow this approach, again we can expect it to decide cases in a
relatively orderly fashion. As under Fisher, there would be no privilege where either compulsion
or incrimination was missing. The polygraph and psychological examination cases will also be
decided the same under both approaches. The privilege will apply because of the sufficient level
of cognition. The privilege will not be applicable in exemplar cases under either approach as
long as the plurality decision in Muniz on the sixth birthday question is wrong. If Hubbell and
the plurality in Muniz are both right then all aspects of incriminating forced reasoning can
constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment. If Hubbell is right and the plurality in Munizis
wrong, however, then the Fifth Amendment would apply to every subpoena that demands
information that incriminates the recipient. The quality of the recipient’s reasoning, or his
mental or intellectual aptitude, however, would not fall within the scope of the privilege. The
privilege would remain concerned only with disclosure of the substantive results of cognition.
The third possibility is that neither Fisher nor Hubbell sets the right threshold for
cognition. Hubbell locates the threshold much lower on the continuum than does Fisher.236
There is broad continuum of possibilities between the two extremes and the Court may try to find
a different spot in the middle, and perhaps the future will turn on Justice Stevens’ comment that
“[i]t was unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of ‘the contents of his
own mind’ in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the request in the
subpoena.”237

It may be that the entire impact of Hubbell will be contained in the word

“extensive.” Future cases would search out the meaning of this term, looking for a location for
the threshold. As an inherently relative term, “extensive” can never provide a clear definition. It
would require courts to continuously analogize and distinguish the facts of future cases,
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gradually limiting the possibilities for the variable. The remaining question would then be
whether the extent of cognition related to the extensiveness of derivative use protection. The
answer to that question would in turn determine whether subpoenas would ever issue for targets
of investigation.
How will the Court choose between these possibilities? Almost certainly it will do so in
light of the “felt necessities of the times.”238 A broad reading of Hubbell coupled with a robust
derivative use doctrine will increase the protections of the Fifth Amendment but also the costs of
investigations, and vice versa. We thus predict that the Court will see both cognition and
derivative use as variables that interact. As the government makes more cognitive demands on
the subject of a subpoena, the probability will increase of both that the act of production is
compelled “testimony” and that the derivative fruits are protected. This will mean that two new
common-law lines of cases will have to be developed. This will have its own costs, including
the lack of a clear a priori rule. Nonetheless, if what we predict comes to pass, it will have the
effect—and some might say the virtue—of capturing the notion that the protection of the citizen
increases as the government makes greater demands.
One last substantive point. It has also not escaped our notice that our theory may pose the
next hypothetical that may bedevil Fifth Amendment scholars. Suppose the state could capture
the product of cognition that it did not cause.239 Suppose that the next “lie detector” machine
reads minds and captures incriminating thoughts even when no questions are asked. Does the
causal difference of the state action between this and the original lie detector hypothetical (where
questions are asked that cause the cognition that in turn causes the physiological responses) make
238
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a difference? Interestingly, not only our positive explanation of the Fifth Amendment but many
other constitutional holdings suggest that it does. Our revised hypothetical looks much more like
a search than an interrogation, which is precisely the line drawn by cases such as Andresen v.
Maryland.240
If there is a normative justification for the positive theory we have developed here, using
the terms as conventionally used in legal scholarship, we suspect that it resides in the point noted
above that one effect of the Court’s opinions is, and we predict will be, to maintain a relationship
between the demands made by government and the protection afforded citizens, however prosaic
that may appear.

This raises the pointed question whether the ease with which the fifth

amendment cases can be given a positive explanation, and their intractability to standard efforts
at “normative justification” casts doubt on whether grand legal theorizing is very useful in any
field of law with the range of either the fourth or fifth amendment, and, relatedly, whether
scholarly efforts to discover the truth in this regard are doomed to failure. This does not mean
that fields of law are necessarily unjustified, but instead that the justification, if it exists, must
come in other terms. The terms plainly applicable to these two areas are the traditional ones of
the rule of law. The Court has strived to make sense of ambiguous directives through creating
and sustaining legal categories that for the most part are recognizable and by responding to new
situations through analogies to prior cases. The applicable terms in which to appraise or criticize
such efforts are clarity, precision, fidelity to text, tradition, and case law, and the use of judgment
in the face of new and unanticipated developments. If we may be indulged one small normative
comment, not only does this accurately capture what the Court is doing, we think it plausible
that, however dull this may appear to the legal theorist, the country may be better off as a result.
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